Historic Visionaries and Wonkish Astigmatics
Newt Gingrich sees the problems in the Mid-East clearly, and the myopia of the Iraq Study Group for what it is:
Core Misconception: Believing Syria and Iran Are Fit Partners for Peace
On Wednesday, the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group issued its report on Iraq.
In its underlying philosophy and its specific recommendations, the Baker-Hamilton Commission report is nothing less than a prescription for American surrender.
The failure of the report centers on its core misconception: believing that the Iranian and Syrian governments can be responsible partners in helping to shape a stable and prosperous Iraq.
Two weeks ago in "Winning the Future," I described a set of 11 key tests to evaluate the Baker-Hamilton report. This week, I outline here how the Baker-Hamilton Commission report measures up to each of these 11 tests. But at a broader level, it is important to understand how dangerous the thinking is that underlies this report.
The Instincts of Neville Chamberlain
In September 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Germany where he had signed the Munich Agreement with dictators Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini that provided for the partial dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the surrender of the Sudetenland territory of Czechoslovakia to Germany.
After hailing the agreement in front of 10 Downing Street for providing "peace in our time," Chamberlain later praised Hitler and Mussolini before the British House of Commons for their helpful part in the capitulation to Germany:
After everything that has been said about the German Chancellor [Hitler] today and in the past, I do feel that the House ought to recognise the difficulty for a man in that position to take back such emphatic declarations as he had already made amidst the enthusiastic cheers of his supporters, and to recognise that in consenting, even though it were only at the last moment, to discuss with the representatives of other Powers those things which he had declared he had already decided once for all, was a real and a substantial contribution on his part. With regard to Signor Mussolini, ... I think that Europe and the world have reason to be grateful to the head of the Italian government for his work in contributing to a peaceful solution.
Hitler and Mussolini Make Good on Their 'Emphatic Declarations'
Five weeks later, the Nazi regime unleashed the violence of Kristallnacht. On November 9 and 10, almost 100 Jews were murdered, thousands of synagogues and Jewish businesses and homes were damaged or destroyed, and approximately 30,000 Jews were rounded up and sent to concentration camps.
Six months later, on March 15, 1939, the German army entered Czechoslovakia and quickly crushed all resistance. The nation of Czechoslovakia, divided internally and overcome by foreign aggression, ceased to exist. World War II had begun.
From Munich to Tehran and Damascus
The Baker-Hamilton Commission's instincts and prescriptions are eerily similar to those of Neville Chamberlain. The commission evidently believes that the United States can achieve peace in our time by flying our secretary of State to Tehran and Damascus and signing this generation's version of the Munich Agreement with respect to Iraq.
The report and its principal recommendations require an exercise in willful ignorance of the nature of the Iranian and Syrian regimes, their clearly stated ideological aims, and their ongoing war against the United States. It outlines a policy of appeasement, predicated on American weakness. It fails to outline a clear policy of victory predicated on taking specific and urgent steps to add to American strength.
A Churchill -- Not a Chamberlain -- Policy
To win in Iraq and around the world against a growing alliance among terrorists, dictatorships, and a fanatical wing of Islam, the United States requires fundamental change in its military doctrine, training and structures, its intelligence capabilities and the integration of civilian and military activities. The instruments of American power simply do not work at the speed and detail needed to defeat the kind of enemies we are encountering in Iraq and elsewhere. The American bureaucracies would rather claim the problem is too hard and leave, because being forced to change this deeply will be very painful and very controversial. We have to learn to win -- again.
Yes, the dangers are greater, the enemy is more determined, and victory in Iraq has turned out to be substantially harder than we had expected in 2003. Yes, we need to change to win. But the Baker-Hamilton Commission report that prescribes a "new way forward" is the wrong prescription in the wrong direction.
Because it fails to define the scale of an emerging Third World War against an alliance of dictatorships and the terrorist forces of militant Islam -- with Iran at the epicenter of this threat -- the report does not outline how difficult the challenge is and how big the effort will have to be.
Because it fails to define victory in this larger war as our goal, the report does not help to mobilize the energy, resources and intensity needed to win.
And because it puts insufficient emphasis on setting clear metrics of achievement for the bureaucracies of the U.S. government, the Baker-Hamilton Commission report does nothing to bolster support for replacing leaders, bureaucrats, and bureaucracies as needed to achieve these goals.
The release of the report confirms a Washington establishment desire to avoid conflict and confrontation by "doing a deal." In the 1930s, that model was called appeasement, not realism, and it led to a disaster. Today, we need a Churchill not a Chamberlain policy for the Middle East.
Core Misconception: Believing Syria and Iran Are Fit Partners for Peace
On Wednesday, the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group issued its report on Iraq.
In its underlying philosophy and its specific recommendations, the Baker-Hamilton Commission report is nothing less than a prescription for American surrender.
The failure of the report centers on its core misconception: believing that the Iranian and Syrian governments can be responsible partners in helping to shape a stable and prosperous Iraq.
Two weeks ago in "Winning the Future," I described a set of 11 key tests to evaluate the Baker-Hamilton report. This week, I outline here how the Baker-Hamilton Commission report measures up to each of these 11 tests. But at a broader level, it is important to understand how dangerous the thinking is that underlies this report.
The Instincts of Neville Chamberlain
In September 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Germany where he had signed the Munich Agreement with dictators Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini that provided for the partial dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the surrender of the Sudetenland territory of Czechoslovakia to Germany.
After hailing the agreement in front of 10 Downing Street for providing "peace in our time," Chamberlain later praised Hitler and Mussolini before the British House of Commons for their helpful part in the capitulation to Germany:
After everything that has been said about the German Chancellor [Hitler] today and in the past, I do feel that the House ought to recognise the difficulty for a man in that position to take back such emphatic declarations as he had already made amidst the enthusiastic cheers of his supporters, and to recognise that in consenting, even though it were only at the last moment, to discuss with the representatives of other Powers those things which he had declared he had already decided once for all, was a real and a substantial contribution on his part. With regard to Signor Mussolini, ... I think that Europe and the world have reason to be grateful to the head of the Italian government for his work in contributing to a peaceful solution.
Hitler and Mussolini Make Good on Their 'Emphatic Declarations'
Five weeks later, the Nazi regime unleashed the violence of Kristallnacht. On November 9 and 10, almost 100 Jews were murdered, thousands of synagogues and Jewish businesses and homes were damaged or destroyed, and approximately 30,000 Jews were rounded up and sent to concentration camps.
Six months later, on March 15, 1939, the German army entered Czechoslovakia and quickly crushed all resistance. The nation of Czechoslovakia, divided internally and overcome by foreign aggression, ceased to exist. World War II had begun.
From Munich to Tehran and Damascus
The Baker-Hamilton Commission's instincts and prescriptions are eerily similar to those of Neville Chamberlain. The commission evidently believes that the United States can achieve peace in our time by flying our secretary of State to Tehran and Damascus and signing this generation's version of the Munich Agreement with respect to Iraq.
The report and its principal recommendations require an exercise in willful ignorance of the nature of the Iranian and Syrian regimes, their clearly stated ideological aims, and their ongoing war against the United States. It outlines a policy of appeasement, predicated on American weakness. It fails to outline a clear policy of victory predicated on taking specific and urgent steps to add to American strength.
A Churchill -- Not a Chamberlain -- Policy
To win in Iraq and around the world against a growing alliance among terrorists, dictatorships, and a fanatical wing of Islam, the United States requires fundamental change in its military doctrine, training and structures, its intelligence capabilities and the integration of civilian and military activities. The instruments of American power simply do not work at the speed and detail needed to defeat the kind of enemies we are encountering in Iraq and elsewhere. The American bureaucracies would rather claim the problem is too hard and leave, because being forced to change this deeply will be very painful and very controversial. We have to learn to win -- again.
Yes, the dangers are greater, the enemy is more determined, and victory in Iraq has turned out to be substantially harder than we had expected in 2003. Yes, we need to change to win. But the Baker-Hamilton Commission report that prescribes a "new way forward" is the wrong prescription in the wrong direction.
Because it fails to define the scale of an emerging Third World War against an alliance of dictatorships and the terrorist forces of militant Islam -- with Iran at the epicenter of this threat -- the report does not outline how difficult the challenge is and how big the effort will have to be.
Because it fails to define victory in this larger war as our goal, the report does not help to mobilize the energy, resources and intensity needed to win.
And because it puts insufficient emphasis on setting clear metrics of achievement for the bureaucracies of the U.S. government, the Baker-Hamilton Commission report does nothing to bolster support for replacing leaders, bureaucrats, and bureaucracies as needed to achieve these goals.
The release of the report confirms a Washington establishment desire to avoid conflict and confrontation by "doing a deal." In the 1930s, that model was called appeasement, not realism, and it led to a disaster. Today, we need a Churchill not a Chamberlain policy for the Middle East.
posted by Timothy Birdnow | 5:09 AM
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